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The extent to which the Self-schema is differentiated from the cognitive schemata representing
other people has important meaning for diversification of social vs. individual identity (Snyder and
Fromkin, 1980; Brewer, 1991; Jarymowicz, 1993), socialization and individuation (Ziller, 1964),
and interdependence and individualism (Waterman, 1981). All these concepts must be taken into
account in order to gain a better understanding of the social world (Greenwald and Pratkanis, 1984;
Baumeister, 2005; Leary and Tangney, 2013).
Cognitive individuation is connected with a subject’s individuality. Unfortunately, this concept
is sometimes treated as being synonymous with an individualistic orientation, in the sense of the
possession of egocentric goals. In the Chinese language, the notion of individuality is replaced by
selfishness (Nisbett, 2003). Yet it is evident that all human decisions and actions involve the ego to
some degree and that ego-involvement is imperative for the realization of goals (Allport, 1955)—
all goals, whether they are personal or social. The concept of individuality can be used to refer to
self-awareness and a clear view of personal preferences and goals, as well as to the ability to delay
gratification and to act in a socially responsible way.
THE MAIN ASSUMPTIONS
The aim of this paper is to contribute some empirical evidence to the analysis of the relationship
between the Self-schema and social functioning. Our studies were based on the following
assumptions (Jarymowicz, 1987; Jarymowicz and Szuster, 2014): (1) individuality results from the
individuation process, which involves differentiation between the Self-Other schemata and leads to
lower or higher Self-schema distinctness; (2) Self-distinctness is a prerequisite of self-awareness
and personal agency, as well as of decentration and the capacity to understand other people
(Piaget, 1965, 1973); (3) Self-distinctness—based on Self vs. We schemata differentiation—allows
transgression of the in-group perspective and reduction of in-group favoritism.
SELF AS THE SUBJECT vs. SELF AS THE DISTINCT OBJECT OF
KNOWLEDGE
The Self duality is considered crucial to personal agency (Reykowski, 1979; Epstein, 1980;
Greenwald and Pratkanis, 1984; Jarymowicz, 2008; Leary and Tangney, 2013). An individual
becomes the object of self-cognition, self-esteem, and self-control, capable of recognizing the world
from a non-egocentric perspective (Markus, 1977; Bandura, 1982; Reykowski, 1989; Kozielecki,
1997; Sedikides and Skowronski, 2003; Baumeister, 2005; Gazzaniga, 2011). The studies discussed
herein focus on the relationships between the degree of the Self-distinctness, the efficacy of
self-control, and the various attitudes that are displayed toward out-group members.
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We drew from research on social comparison processes in
the operationalization of the Self-schema distinctness. Numerous
data have implicated that estimating the degree of Self-Other
similarity depends on the motivation to be similar/dissimilar
to/from others (Suls and Miller, 1977). Some results showed
that whilst the Self-Other similarity is attractive, so too is the
difference. It was found that an unconscious tendency exists to
seek out diversity and uniqueness (Fromkin, 1972; Codol, 1979;
Snyder and Fromkin, 1980), and that the degree of similarity
is often underestimated (Codol and Jarymowicz, 1984). In our
research, we distinguished between: (1) assessment of the Self-
Other similarity by an individual; and (2) similarity between the
attributes ascribed by an individual to the Self and to Others
during the course of a procedure that did not involve explicit
comparisons.
MEASUREMENT OF SELF-DISTINCTNESS
The Questionnaire of Social Perception (Jarymowicz, 1993)
was developed to measure the Self-schema distinctness. This
technique consists of three parts, which are successively handed
to the participants in order to focus their attention on: (1) Others;
(2) the We category; and (3) the Self. The questionnaire contains
a list of 70 human traits (like creativity, honesty, rationality). The
list is used three times.
1. Each participant first chooses the 10 traits to which she/he
refers (“most often”) when thinking about other people.
2. In the next stage, the participant first has to indicate who the
people are that she/he refers to as “we”, and is then required to
select 10 traits that she/he recognizes in reference to “we.”
3. Finally, the participant selects the 10 traits referred (“most
often”) to the Self.
Two indices of Self-distinctness are computed: (1) the number of
unrepeated traits ascribed to the Self vs. to Others (SOD); and (2)
the number of unrepeated traits ascribed to the Self vs. to the We
(SWD). The latter SWD indices were used to test the hypothesis
predicting that Self-We cognitive distinctness is necessary to limit
the tendency to in-group favoritism.
RESEARCH ON THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN SELF-DISTINCTNESS AND
PERSONAL AGENCY
Wolak (1993) showed that the efficacy of emotional control
training is related to Self-distinctness. His hypotheses were
based on reports stating that Self-identity correlates with the
efficacy of self-control (e.g., Organ, 1973). In Wolak’s laboratory
studies, unexpected sounds were applied to provoke emotional
tension and the participants were requested to try to relax as
quickly as possible. Changes in the number of spontaneous
fluctuations and skin resistance were measured throughout. The
emotional control training consisted of giving the participants
some feedback on how effective they were at reducing level
of tension. After the accurate feedback-based training, most
of the participants were better at controlling their tension.
However, when false feedback was provided in the next stage
of the experiment, only the participants with high SOD indices
displayed the same level of self-control improvement as in the
previous stage.
We assumed that the Self-schema development leads to a
stage wherein self-control becomes effortless and automatic.
Some implications were tested by use of the implicit affective
priming paradigm (Murphy and Zajonc, 1993; Ohme, 2007),
which involves subliminal exposure to affective stimuli (faces
displaying expressions of disgust or joy). Such implicit priming
usually influences the subsequent evaluation of explicitly exposed
neutral stimuli (unfamiliar Chinese ideograms): neutral stimuli
are rated positively or negatively, depending on the valence
of the implicitly primed stimulus (Kobylin´ska and Karwowska,
2014). In some of our studies (Jarymowicz, 2008), we used a
modification of the affective priming paradigm to measure the
implicit self-reference effect (Błaszczak and Imbir, 2012). There,
the participants were presented with Chinese ideograms and
told that they denoted human traits. They were then asked to
estimate the degree to which a given ideogram described them.
As a result, the participants were more likely to ascribe positively
primed ideograms to themselves than negatively primed ones.
But we also found that the magnitude of this effect varied
with the level of Self-distinctness. The higher the SOD index
of a subject, the lower was the implicit self-reference effect,
thus, the less likely she/he was to attribute neutral, unfamiliar
ideograms to her or himself. In other words, the data showed
that some people are resistant to affective priming and fail
to relate irrelevant stimuli to themselves (even those exposed
implicitly).
To explore this finding, we turned to literature on implicit
information processing (Uleman and Bargh, 1989; Reber,
1993; Underwood, 1996; Holyoak and Morrison, 2005). We
hypothesized that some people have some insight into implicit
information. To test this hypothesis, we used the implicit
semantic priming paradigm: the subliminal exposition of words
(Dobrenko and Jarymowicz, 2011). The participants were
told that some words were invisible, and then subsequently
asked to indicate which of the set of two explicitly exposed
words—a synonym or a new word—corresponded to the word
presented subliminally. A series of experiments showed that
some participants were capable of recognizing the meaning
of subliminally presented words, wherein they were more
susceptible to choose the synonyms of the subliminal stimulus
than unrelated words. In further studies, we demonstrated that
he level of word recognition positively correlates with the Self-
distinctive schema complexity (Jarymowicz et al., 2013).
RESEARCH ON THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN SELF-DISTINCTNESS AND
SOCIAL ATTITUDES
Self-distinctness and the concept of individuality are often
associated with diverse manifestations of egocentrism.
For instance, twentieth century intercultural psychology
characterized Eastern cultures as representing a conjunction
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of “interdependent” Self-schema and prosocial attitudes,
whereas Western cultures were held to represent a combination
of “independent” Self-schema, egocentric perceptions, and
more or less egoistic behavior (Markus and Kitayama, 1991).
Some authors try to argue that “prosocial orientation” often
benefits the in-group (e.g., Triandis, 1989); we try to argue that
attitudes toward in-group vs. out-group members depend on the
Self-We-Others schemata differentiation (Jarymowicz, 1999).
In a study by Krzemionka (1993), participants were asked to
declare their preferences with respect to 50 different activities
and then shown the preferences of an unknown partner. In
one condition, the “partner” was highly dissimilar; in the
second condition, the “partner” was highly similar to the
participant. Next, the participants estimated the attractiveness of
this “partner”. The degree of Self-distinctness was also measured.
Krzemionka showed that the estimations of partner attractiveness
were related to SOD indices; more specifically, those participants
with a low SOD rated similar partners as being more attractive
than dissimilar partners, whereas no such differences were
observed among participants with high SOD indices.
In studies taking into account the in-group vs. out-
group opposition, we also found some confirmation that Self-
distinctness plays a role in social perception (Jarymowicz,
2002, 2006). Some studies were based on the assumption
that the similarity perceived between the Self and the Other
corresponds in some way to the psychological self-other
distance (Codol, 1979)—we found, for instance, that Polish
participants underestimated their similarity to another person
more frequently when the “other person” presented to them
was German or Russian rather than a fellow countryman—but
the effect was not significant in groups of participants with the
highest relative level of Self-distinctness (of the SWD indices).
In numerous other studies, we found that effects related to in-
group vs. out-group divisions correlate clearly with the Self-We
differentiation. In one study (Jarymowicz, 2006), the participants
were asked to read the positive opinions (condition 1) or the
negative opinions (condition 2) of foreigners about Poles. They
were then requested to generate (“as much as possible”) the
positive and negative traits of Poles and Russians. In the first
condition, the participants listed a similar number of positive
and negative traits for both Poles and Russians. In the second
condition, however, they showed a greater positive inclination
toward Poles. Once again, this effect was only observed in
participants with a relatively low SWD index.
A long and systematic series of studies on conspiracy beliefs
carried out by Grzesiak-Feldman (2006) brought clear and
coherent results. Data showed that Self-distinctness (the SWD
indices) negatively correlated with conspiracy theory beliefs
concerning the diverse activities of Jews.
Analogous effects were found in reference to individual
representatives of in-group vs. out-group members. In an
experimental study (Jarymowicz and Szuster, 2014), the
participants were presented with a photograph of an attractive
young woman and a brief description of her life and interests.
In one condition, she was described as having participated in
the Miss Polonia beauty pageant some years ago, while in the
other condition, there was reference to her participation in the
Miss Israel beauty pageant. In both conditions, the participants
were asked several questions about the woman’s skills and
abilities. The main finding was that she was rated as being more
competent when identified as being Polish rather than Israeli,
but this effect of discrimination was only observed in those
participants with a low SWD index.
TO SUMMARIZE
Taken together, the results of the studies mentioned above
indicate a certain degree of interdependence between the Self-
schema distinctness and some aspects of personal agency (e.g.,
self-control and unconscious resistance to the influence of
subliminal, irrelevant affective stimuli). Moreover, the results of
the studies suggest that Self-distinctness (especially distinctness
between the Self-We schemata) is an important determinant of
the ability to perceive the Other from a non-egocentric or non-
ethnocentric perspective. On the basis of the empirical data, we
posit that Self-distinctness is a necessary (although not sufficient)
condition of exocentric altruism and engaging for the benefit of
other people—even those who are members of the out-group
(Karyłowski, 1982; Szuster, 1994, 2005; Rutkowska and Szuster,
2011; Jarymowicz and Szuster, 2014).
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